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Property Rights and the Endangered Species
Act: A Renascent Assault on Land Use
Regulation*
Ira Michael Heyman**

I. INTRODUCTION

It might seem odd that I have chosen the Endangered Species Act' as
the topic for this prestigious lecture concerning the law of real property.
But it is appropriate because the Hefner Fund celebrates Archie Hefner's
"competence and devotion to the advancements of legal practice in land
use management, property rights, and environmental planning. ..

."

The

statute of which I speak, of course, protects rare and endangered animals
and plants. But it does this largely by seeking to protect their
habitats-land and water locations-habitats useful for other inconsistent
purposes. Clearly we are concerned with land management and planning.
Three contemporary western situations that exemplify this are the spotted
owl in its old growth forest habitat in the Northwest valuable for timber
products; the Delta smelt which needs water that otherwise would be used
for irrigations and urban consumption in California; and the. California
gnatcatcher which requires coastal sage shrub locations otherwise
developable for housing in Southern California.
Thus we are involved with land planning and management to resolve
collisions between desired uses. Some of the collisions occur on public
lands-as in the case of the spotted owl. Some occur where title (or rights)
are arguably unclear-for instance the Delta Smelt involving water rights
in the flow of the Sacramento. And som&occur on clearly private land-as
in the case of the gnatcatcher.
*
This address was given as a part of the Archie Hefner Memorial Lecture Series at McGeorge School
of Law on November 16, 1993.
**
Counselor to the Secretary and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy, Office of the Secretary, United
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I will be speaking mainly about habitat located on private land. It is
there, of course, that the property rights' issues are most pronounced. Chief
among them is the regulation-taking line. As my title indicates, the
property "taking" argument is coming back. It is prominent in many
western land controversies-rights to graze cattle on the public lands,
rights to carry on hard rock mining, and rights to devote one's land to
desired uses regardless of the consequences to endangered species. The
most radical proposal regarding takings to date was the one offered as an
amendment to the House bill creating the National Biological Survey. 2 It
would require Federal Agencies to compensate owners for "any diminution
in value" caused by any action taken under designated environmental laws,
most prominently the Endangered Species Act.
II. THE

ENDANGERED SPECIES

ACT

IN GENERAL

The ESA focuses on the listing of individual species. I think that it
would be wiser to focus instead on habitat supporting many species. This
latter approach would facilitate advanced land use planning rather than
crisis management and would help determine which species upon which
to concentrate attention. It would also create an opportunity to balance
conservation and development in a more sensible way than presently
occurs. The present legal environment can make it exceedingly difficult to
take those actions that avoid serious equity impacts on private land owners
and people who rely on the resources of the public lands for their jobs and
lifestyles.
A glance at the core process of the ESA illustrates that it calls for
crisis management. Most listings proceed from petitions filed with the Fish
and Wildlife Service of the Department of the Interior by individuals and
organizations. The Service carries on a biological investigation if a prima
facie case seems evident on the basis of information proffered by the
applicant and it concludes whether the species is on its last legs
(endangered) or on its way there (threatened). If it concludes that either is
true, it is a federal crime to "take"-any of the species unless an exemption
is granted. "Take" is much broader than kill-it includes nearly everything
detrimental to the species which covers, where relevant, destruction of
habitat critical to its survival.

2.
.3.

158

H.R. 1845, 103rd Cong. (1993).
H.R. 1388, 103rd Cong. (1993).

1994 / Property Rights and the Endangered Species Act
Ideally, as the Act is constructed, there would by prompt investigation
on every qualifying petition. Realistically, however, investigations can be
costly and time consuming and Fish and Wildlife's budget is inadequate.
At any time, therefore, there are hundreds or perhaps thousands of
candidate species awaiting processing depending on how energized are the
petitioners. Undoubtedly, some species fail during the wait. The Act,
interestingly, provides no criteria for scheduling investigations and the
Service's attempts to construct priority criteria have been less than
satisfying and have differed in various regions of the country.
Putting aside scheduling problems, in general, the Act only comes into
play when a species is on the way out. The characteristic processes of the
Act do not anticipate potential troubles in the future. The stated purposes
of the Act underscores this: "The purposes of the Act," it states, "are to
provide a means whereby the ecosystems, upon which endangered species
and threatened species depend may be conserved, to provide a program for
the conservation of such endangered species and threatened species ....
The Act does not seek to preserve ecosystems important to the sustenance
of any species in order to prevent them from becoming endangered or
threatened. The bite of the Act comes later. Thus, a crisis is at hand when
the process begins. Secretary Babbitt speaks of avoiding train wrecks. The
ESA is designed to produce them.
Examples abound of such train wrecks. A story highlighted in an
article in the January 1992 issue of The Atlantic Monthly tells the tale of
a young man whose dream was to build a world-class golf course and
related hotel and residential development proximate, but a bit inland, of the
Oregon coast. He envisaged another Pebble Beach. The land was not in
pristine condition--cow pasture and an off-road vehicle site. He organized
the landowners to be backers, borrowed money and engaged a famous
gold-course designer. His development was frustrated by the presence of
the habitat (one of the few remaining) for the rare Oregon silverspot
butterfly which had been registered as threatened under the ESA.
This example suggests that an advanced planning approach might have
balanced protection and development (allowing golf while protecting
butterflies), moderated compensation claims, and avoided the collision. My
second example again involves the Pacific Northwest, but this time the
forests-especially the old growth forests. A good number of these are in
public ownership largely managed by the Forest Service (in the

4.
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Department of Agriculture) and to some extent by the Bureau of Land
Management (in the Department of Interior). You have all read about the
Administration's efforts to come to an outcome which decently balances
the plight of the spotted owl against timber cutting that sustains the forest
economy and the lifestyle of loggers and their families. The decade of the
eighties saw a great acceleration in timber cutting to meet market
demands-including a heavy Japanese demand for raw timber for process
and use. Much of the increase resulted from technological advances that
raised productivity. But the increase, and its haphazard means, caused
broad deleterious impacts. The imperilling of the spotted owl was only
one. Hand in hand came stump farms, degraded streams, and a precipitous
decline in fish populations, especially salmon. Focus on the spotted owl
was, in a way, a surrogate for general despoliation. It was a convenient
handle for lawsuits by environmental organizatiofis. These lawsuits were
successful because those in control in the Eighties failed to seek a balance
between production and protection.
The forest example again illustrates vividly how collisions between
species protection and production could be moderated by intelligent
planning well anterior to the dispute. If we had carried on in the seventies
or early eighties the analyses done in the past 10 months, we would have
moderated the timber cut, protected spotted owls, streams, salmon, and a
host of other species in especially rich habitats of the old growth forests,
and moderated the impacts on jobs and lifestyles that have been caused by
the roller coaster of high cut and no cut.
III. EXISTING PROVISIONS THAT AMELIORATE COLLISIONS
There are two provisions in the ESA which seek to ameliorate
collisions. The first involves public lands [section 7] where Federal land
agencies (and private applicants for permits on the public lands) can avoid
criminal and civil penalties for "take" by consulting with the Fish and
Wildlife Service where actions might jeopardize the continued existence
of endangered or threatened species or destroy habitat critical to their
survival.' If a project is contemplated, the proponent agency (or applicant)
does a biological assessment (a part of an environmental impact analysis).
If in the Service's opinion the action or project can go forward as planned,

5.
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or under added terms and conditions, without jeopardizing the species'
survival, the action goes forward. This is the usual result.
This public agency process helps moderate by formalizing a reviewing
process before the Agency makes irreversible or irretrievable commitments
of resources. If adequately followed, it would have avoided the terrible
collision between the planned Tellico Dam in Tennessee and the snail
darter, the first major ESA case that reached the United States Supreme
Court. 6 That case confirmed the basic philosophy of the Act as I have
described it. In that instance, opponents of the project petitioned well after
huge planning, and construction costs had been incurred, but, nevertheless,
the project was halted to protect the snail darter.
The reviewing process, however, even if well followed, is largely an
exercise of due diligence. It prevents inadvertent destruction of species.
But it does not provide direction well in advance of the intended action
and hence does not articulate a planning basis for land management.
Moreover, even a good investigation does not provide complete assurance
for species not picked up in the assessment that might still frustrate aspects
of the desired project. This is less a problem in a legal sense on public
land than private, except where a permit holder's investment is
jeopardized.
The second process for ameliorating collisions is designed for the
private landowner. It is the conservation plan (usually dealing with habitat)
that specifies how the landowner plans to assure that contemplated
development will not unduly impinge on listed species. This might be by
so designing the project that critical habitat is preserved. This was the
outcome in the first use of the process on San Bruno Mountain in San
Mateo County, which provided for the maintenance of patches of habitat
necessary for the survival of the Blue Mission butterfly. If the Fish and
Wildlife Service is satisfied, after public hearings, that any destruction of
species pursuant to the plan will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of
the survival and recovery of the species, the plan is approved and the
applicant is exempted from liability for incidental takings of the species.
This process could help solve the problem of the Oregon development
highlighted in The Atlantic Monthly, if the conservation criteria can be met
and the Service is willing to be decisive and so attest. Decisiveness is a
problem, however, given all the uncertainties that attend a prediction of
biological behavior. Often, and understandably, Service personnel Want to

6.
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delay decision until more studies are accomplished despite the injection
that decisions should be made on the basis of the best available scientific
information. Delay, of course, can be the end of a development project
because parties must be held together, options are expensive, and interest
and taxes normally must be paid.
The process is designed for large land developers--ones who likely
have enough land to devote to habitat protection, as well as development,
and have the funds necessary to carry on the required biological and
planning studies and to pay holding costs. Each conservation plan is
specially sculpted. It is not a process that is well adapted for the use of
owners of small parcels.
IV. THE PRESENT ESA PROCESSES AND PROPERTY RIGHTS
Before I explore what to me is a more ideal system for species
protection-one built on early planning-I would like to take note of the
property rights taking arguments that have been raised in the context of the
Act. (In evaluating them it is useful to note that not one successful taking
claim under the Act has been prosecuted in any Federal Court).
The most extreme argument suggests, as the House bill I noted would
have provided, that any diminution in land value must be compensated. I
cannot imagine that Representative Tauzin of Louisiana, the bill's author,
believed this premised on a constitutional imperative. But it reflects a
viewpoint of a number of radical reactionaries gathered under the banner
of "Wise Use" and other like organizations. I say radical reactionaries
because they echo arguments made during the post Civil War 19th Century
and early Twentieth Century where any impediment to market outcomes
was viewed by some as constitutionally prohibited by the Due Process and
Contract Clauses. Interestingly, while these views frustrated such matters
as child labor laws, they found no expression in cases involving laws that
affected land values by prohibiting particular uses. Prior to 1922, no
Supreme Court case found a taking of property rights in land by the
exercise of regulatory power. Physical invasion or acquisition of title were
necessary. Typical of the period was the First Justice Harlan's rejection of
claims in Mugler v. Kansas7 where state-enacted prohibition rendered
valueless building and machinery used to produce spirits. His grounds were
broad:

7.

123 U.S. 623 (1887).
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A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are
declared ... to be injurious to the health, morals, and safety of the
community, cannot... be deemed a taking or an appropriation of
property for the public benefit. Such legislation does not disturb the
owner in the control or use of his property for lawful purposes...
but is only a declaration by the State that its use by anyone, for
certain forbidden purposes, is prejudicial to the public interests.8
These.outcomes in both English and American Courts reflected a long
history of common law nuisance principles-both private and
public-which recognized the interconnectedness of land use and the
propriety of judicial or legislative intervention of protecting private parties
and the public interest.
Two Supreme Court cases in the 1920's lay today's background for
evaluating the Wise Use argument. First was the Supreme Court decision
in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,9 in 1926, (nearly 70 years ago) upholding
a comprehensive zoning ordinance against the attack that it improperly
deprived landowners of substantial value by prohibiting particular uses in
particular zones. Since Euclid, it is well accepted that Americans who live
in urban areas are permissibly subject to a broad range of land use
restrictions designed to protect and enhance the common good.
There is no discernible reason why rural Americans are not similarly
vulnerable to regulations which reasonably restrain landowner discretion
in order to protect species of fish and wildlife. These arguably are simply
rural manifestations of the generally urban phenomena of zoning. I suspect
that part of the problem is that folk who live outside the exurban ring have
considerably less familiarity with the phenomena of zoning, and in any
event are contemptuous of restraints on individualism long ago accepted
where populations are more dense and thus conflicting.
The second case of importance was Pennsylvania Coal Company v.
Mahon'1 which held, contrary to the prior case, that regulation which
deprived a landowner of too much value would be viewed as a taking of
property rights and thus impermissible. This limitation, as spelled out in
the recent case of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council," provides
the most meaningful context for evaluating the property taking issue.

8.
9.
10.
11.
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Mahont however, has been read by some to suggest other analytical
obstacles.
Prominently it has been argued that regulations characterized as
exacting benefits are different than those preventing harm. Thus, for
instance, regulation for the protection of species, it is argued, is different
than regulation fashioned to prevent inconsistent uses such as a shopping
center in a residential neighborhood; that the latter prevents harmful use
while the former-species protection--exacts a benefit. This has been one
of the argued formulas to distinguish permissible regulation from
urconstitutional taking based in part on Mahon. The distinction, however,
has rarely proved decisive. The problem is, as stated by Justice Scalia in
the Lucas case, that harm and benefit are simply opposite sides of the
same coin and defy rational analytic differentiation. Thus, regulation
requiring the use of land within a zone only for industrial purposes can be
viewed either as preventing harms to industrial users created by proximate
location of residences peopled by those who might object to noise and
congestion, or a required dedication to a particular use because the city
wants to attract revenues and jobs. The same analysis, and confusion,
attends exclusive agricultural zoning. Most pertinently, wetlands regulation
could be viewed as exacting a contribution of desirable habitat for public
purposes or as a means of prohibiting a landowner from harming a vital
ecosystem resource.
One of the most definitive rejections of harm-benefit distinctions arose
in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 2 where the
Court upheld landmark regulation which prohibited owners of buildings
classified as landmarks from changing exteriors so long as the buildings
produced a reasonable return in their limited configuration. The argument
was that such owners were being required to forego economic
opportunities afforded others in their area (e.g., greater height and
densities) simply to benefit the citizens of New York and that the latter
might pay for this benefit. The argument was rejected.
Property taking doctrine relevant to us is best expressed in the Lucas
case. As many of you know, Lucas involved the validity of South Carolina
legislation hypothesized for purposes of the decision to prohibit all uses of
the complainant's parcel located on a barrier island. Justice Scalia for the
Court said that such a regulation amounted to a taking if it prohibited all
reasonably productive uses, unless all such prospective uses could be

12.

48 U.S. 104 (1978).

1994 / Property Rights and the EndangeredSpecies Act
viewed as common law nuisances. The gravamen of the decision, however,
was not forced dedication of the parcel to public benefit, but rather a
pronouncement that regulation which sterilized land values by prohibiting
all "reasonable" economic uses was invalid, even i to the chagrin of a
number of us, the reasonable economic uses were ecologically harmful.
(Scalia refused to view ecological harm as a common law nuisance.) The
bottom line is that ecological protection is a legitimate objective, but the
regulation better leave the landowner with some reasonable economic use.
Reasonable is nowhere defined, but prior cases suggest that devaluation
can be substantial, but not close to total.
Many of my colleagues find the Scalia approach unsatisfactory as
providing a definitive line for differentiating between valid regulation and
invalid taking. The Court, however, seems to be saying that a rule that is
certain in meaning, even if unsatisfactory in some applications, is better
than a rule of such uncertain application that predicting an outcome is
torturous; the Lucas rule seems no less unsatisfactory than the bright line
attempts. The problem, of course, is that we are seeking a formula to
determine when considerations of equity demand that a burden be shared
more broadly than by a relatively small number' of landowners. The
circumstances where burdens are differentially imposed are so legion and
so difficult to classify that it is doubtful that we can define another single
theory. Moreover, we tend to suspect that burden and benefits work
themselves out over time roughly equitably among landowners and that we
should only intervene where results are particularly egregious. Finally, no
one has come up with a workable administrative means systematically to
balance costs and benefits. In fact, perhaps the most telling criticism of
Representative Tauzin's attempt to require universal compensation is its
utter unworkability.
There is one problem suggested in cases prior to Lucas that still leaves
prediction uncertain. This is how to identify the property the value of
which is impacted. If I own one hundred acres and am asked to forego
development of five acres important as butterfly habitat, does a court focus
on the five or the one hundred in determining total deprivation? The
distinction is crucial. In one analysis, I lose 5 percent of the value of 100
acres; in the latter 100 percent of the five acres. Most cases suggest that
the base for the calculation will be 100 acres. Otherwise, for instance,
conventional setback requirements would be constitutionally suspect.
The foregoing suggests the format for dealing with property taking
claims under the present cases-by-case approach of the Endangered Species
Act.
165
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Larger developers should normally pose few problems. In most
instances, such developers can internalize the costs of creating and
implementing conservation plans and still have considerable value left.
Either habitat can be set aside or developers can mitigate by providing
habitat elsewhere. So long as the Service avoids undue delay, successful
attack is doubtful.
That taking claims can be avoided, of course, does not assure developer
cooperation. Perhaps the most vexing problem involves certainty.
Expensive dedication or mitigation in return for a permit does not protect
against the discovery of another species that will start the process all over
again unless there has been total buildout. In modern days of staged
development, for many in this State under developments agreements, the
risk can be significant.
Successful taking claims involving smaller landowners are more
probable. It is more likely, for instance, that all or a very large proportion
of a small landowner's property will consist of critical habitat. Under the
ESA, the Service can take into account the economic impact of critical
habitat designation on a landowner if exclusion from critical habitat
designation will not lead to the extinction of the species in question. There
is thus the possibility of an exemption (much like a zoning variance) in
many cases.
Other ameliorating schemes are not feasible, however, under a case-bycase approach. Considerable thought is being given these days to devices
that spread out burden and benefit of regulation to assure more equitable
distribution of costs, even if not required by the Fifth Amendment. One
device, used successfully in the New Jersey Pinelands, is transferable
development rights. Unfortunately, however, the case-by-case approach of
the ESA, makes it impossible to use such an approach.
In the absence of a spread-out technique, and where "variances" are
impossible, it will probably be necessary to acquire the parcels of smaller
owners. Finding a source of funds is difficult and it is improbable that
local levies will be devoted to effectuate a purely federal program. It is
possible, of course, to liberalize land exchange opportunities. Under
present limitations, however, exchanges will rarely be available. This will
result in liberal use of exemptions and, where possible, heavy reliance on
public lands to carry the critical habitat burden and such a result might be
unwise as a matter of both biology and economics.
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V. PLANNING AND REGULATING IN ADVANCE

Advance multi-species planning, as a compliment to the species-byspecies approach, solves a multitude of policy, planning, and legal
problems inherent in the ESA. An easy way to envisage how this would
work is to imagine a county or city general plan with a conservation
element (perhaps combined with the open space element) that identifies
critical habitat for numbers of species. Imagine further that the important
habitat is defined on a regional ecosystem basis by a regional or State
agency (in California, the State Fish and Game Commission) under
relevant statutory and regulatory guidelines. Further imagine an
implementation strategy for protecting the lands so identified in a systemic
way. Development would be permitted under rules that protect needed
habitat or prohibited completely in some areas. Finally, imagine review by
the Federal Fish and Wildlife Service which would be empowered to
exempt the whole of the cooperating political jurisdictions from species
"taking" limitations for at least ten years, if it was satisfied that the
multispecies plan adequately protected presently listed species and
nonlisted candidate species waiting in the wings. Presume that the
exemption could be ended for substantial departures from the plan, thus
leaving the Service as a monitor, but not a direct regulator.
Note how many problems of the Act are addressed by this approach.
First, the approach ameliorates the problem of total species coverage by
choosing out habitat protection as the organizing principle for the
application of regulation. Thus, priority is determined on the basis of
"rich" habitat, the sustenance of which will seek to assure survival of
species before they need to be listed, as well as listed ones. Of course,
some species will be lost by reliance on this process; but they are being
lost now because energy and money are limited and they are never reached
under the case-by-case approach.
Secondly, the approach also moderates the balancing problem by
integrating habit conservation into a process where other needs are also
portrayed. The likelihood of making better accommodations between
conservation and development where all is being planned together is much
greater than where species preservation is a last-minute add on.
Finally, the approach also addresses notable legal and planning
problems. It creates geographic and temporal zones of relative certainty.
If the conservation element permits development in particular places,
developers, local officials, and environmentalists know where these are. If
the element prohibits development, or conditions it under performance
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standards, another kind of certainty is created and the market can adjust
itself to the reality. Moreover, the very act of designation focuses argument
on the important values at stake and minimizes the probability of future
destructive change in the regulations. Advance planning helps avoid the
collisions of crisis management.
Advance designation also aids in the assessment of the costs of critical
habitat conservation and suggests means to minimize the need to acquire
property into public ownership. Also, by identifying properties which
probably must be acquired, it arms local conservancies with important
information to guide their acquisition programs. Additionally, "zoning" of
this sort permits the designation of transfer zones for purposes of
establishing a market for development rights which will tend to minimize
acquisition requirements. Finally, advance designation gives time to
organize those institutions necessary to manage habitat and to determine
the means for raising funds to operate them.
There is a serious limitation, as well as a heady opportunity, offered
by the multi-species planning approach. The limitation is that the federal
government, alone, cannot conceivably create and administer a land
planning and regulation system on private lands within the States. Even if
constitutionally permissible, pervasive federal land planning and zoning is
a political impossibility. The opportunity, however, is that fashioning such
a system would stimulate a creative federalism with states and local
governments playing a major role in both planning and management and
with the federal role-with respect to private land-limited to setting
standards and monitoring performance. This is a much more salubrious
role for federal officials than to be the equivalent of zoning administrators.
VI. A TEST OF THE APPROACH-IN CALIFORNIA

A major experiment towards these ends is occurring in Southern
California in a joint operation between state and federal officials. The state
mechanism is the Natural Communities Conservation Planning Act which
provides for regional planning at an ecosystem level guided by the
California Department of Fish and Game. NCCP works in concert with the
California Endangered Species Act-an Act quite similar to the federal
version.
Under the NCCP, the State Department of Fish and Game entered into
agreements with local governments and private landowners for the
preparation of plans for management and conservation of multiple species,
including ones in jeopardy of extinction. The plans must be consistent with
168
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State guidelines and must be approved by Fish and Game to be effective.
Essentially they identify habitat important to the sustenance of multiple
species and establish rules designed to assure continued sustenance. These
might include limitations on development and actions necessary to improve
habitat. The plans cover public and private lands within cooperating local
jurisdictions, if the owners agree to such coverage. The inducement for
agreements is the state's willingness to waive prohibitions against takings
of protected species on land covered by enforceable plans. The beauties of
the approach are twofold. First, the studies and planning ideally occur
before particular development is proposed. The approach is thus proactive,
not reactive-much like advance urban planning and zoning. Second, the
approach is habitat oriented, protects a multiplicity of species (including
endangered ones), and reduces the numbers of species that will become
vulnerable to extinction, thus minimizing conflicts.
The California approach is being tested for the first time in Orange,
Riverside, and San Diego Counties. The federal government is an active
participant in two regards. It has joined the California effort by agreeing
to permit incidental taking of a threatened species under the federal
law-the gnatcatcher--on lands for which NCCP plans have been
approved. It has also provided appropriations to help fund the scientific
efforts that underlie the preparation of the plans.
The California approach addresses the three important needs I
previously identified: (1) It protects species before they are on their last
legs; (2) ideally, it acts in advance of conflict and producte relative
certainty as to which lands are and are not sensitive for species protection,
thus letting the market absorb the information and act consistently; and (3)
it provides a rich opportunity for state/federal interaction with local folks
doing land planning and regulation and federal officials exercising
oversight to assure that these will protect endangered species. Moreover,
it provides a good model for national adoption which could be stimulated
by modest amendments to the Federal ESA.
This combined federal/state approach is exactly what my boss-Bruce
Babbitt-applauds. In his words:
"The only effective way to protect endangered species is to plan
ahead to conserve the ecosystems upon which they depend. I
applaud the cooperative effect here to protect the gnatcatcher. This
may become an example of what must be done across the country
if we are to avoid the environmental and economic train wrecks
we've seen in the last decade."
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VII. CONCLUSION

Advance designation on a habitat basis affecting private lands will
require not only changes in the ESA, but the willingness of states to
undertake obligations similar to those bring developed in California in San
Diego, Orange and Riverside Counties covering coastal sage shrub habitat.
Incentives will be necessary, but that is another topic for another time.
Until this millennium arrives, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service can
experiment with the approach on ecosystems on the public lands.
Beginnings have occurred in the Pacific Northwest and in South Florida.
We should take advantage of these opportunities to hone our
methodologies and prepare for a future that better marries species
conservation and development and deals effectively with problems
encountered under the present Endangered Species Act.
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